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POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF TAX-EXEMPT
CHURCHES, PARTICULARLY AFTER CITIZENS
UNITED V FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
AND CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 8 BAN ON
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: RENDER UNTO
CAESAR WHAT IS CAESAR'S...
JOHN R. DOROCAK* & LLOYD E. PEAKE**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code places restrictions on the political
activity of churches. Specifically, I.R.C. § 501(c) states that in order for
an organization to qualify for tax exempt status under § 501(c), the
organization must be operated so that
[(1)] no substantial part of the activities of which
is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in
subsection (h)), and . . . [(2)] [it] does not participate in,
or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing
of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office.'
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1. I.R.C.§§ 501(a), 501(c), 501(h), and 4911(d) provide in part as follows:
501(a) Exemption from taxation - An organization described in
subsection (c) or (d) or section 401(a) shall be exempt from
taxation under this subtitle unless such exemption is denied under
section 502 or 503.
501(c)(3) List of Exempt Organizations - Corporations, and any
community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment),
or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of
the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of
which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection
(h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including
the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to), any candidate for
public office.
501(h) Expenditures by Public Charities to Influence Legislation
(1) General rule - In the case of an organization to which this
subsection applies, exemption from taxation under subsection (a)
shall be denied because a substantial part of the activities of such
organization consists of carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation, but only if such organization
normally;
(A) makes lobbying expenditures in excess of the lobbying
ceiling amount for such organization for each taxable year, or
(B) makes grass roots expenditures in excess of the grass roots
ceiling amount for such organization for each taxable year.
(2) Definitions - for purposes of this subsection -
(A) Lobbying expenditures -The term "lobbying expenditures"
means expenditures for the purpose of influencing legislation (as
defined in section 4911(d)).
(B) Lobbying ceiling amount - The lobbying ceiling amount for
any organization for any taxable year is 150 percent of the
lobbying nontaxable amount for such organization for such
taxable year, determined under section 4911.
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(C) Grass Roots expenditures - The term "grass roots
expenditures" means expenditures for the purpose of influencing
legislation (as defined in section 4911(d) without regard to
paragraph (1)(B) thereof).
(D) Grass roots ceiling amount - The grass roots ceiling amount
for any organization for any taxable year is 150 percent of the
grass roots nontaxable amount for such organization for such
taxable year, determined under section 4911.
(3) Organizations to which this subsection applies - This
subsection shall apply to any organization which has elected (in
such manner and at such time as the Secretary may prescribe) to
have the provisions of this subsection apply to such organization
and which, for the taxable year which includes the date the
election is made, is described in subsection (c)(3) and -
(A) is described in paragraph (4), and
(B) is not a disqualified organization under paragraph (5).
(5) Disqualified organizations - for purposes of paragraph (3)
and an organization is a disqualified organization if it is -
(A) described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(i) (relating to churches),
(B) an integrated auxiliary of a church or of a convention or
association of churches, or
(C) a member of an affiliated group of organizations (within the
meaning of section 4911(f)(2)) if one or more members of such
group is described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
4911(d) Influencing Legislation -
(1) General rule - except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2),
for purposes of this section, the term "influencing legislation"
means -
(A) any attempt to influence any legislation through an attempt to
affect the opinions of the general public or any segment thereof,
and
(B) any attempt to influence any legislation through
communication with any member or employee of a legislative
body, or with any government official or employee who may
participate in the formulation of the legislation.
(2) Exceptions - For purposes of this section, the term
"influencing legislation," with respect to an organization, does
not include -
(A) making available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study, or
research;
(B) providing of technical advice or assistance (where such
advice would otherwise constitute the influencing of legislation)
to a governmental body or to a committee or other subdivision
450
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On the other hand, some ministers have sought to challenge such
restrictions through acts of civil disobedience, in order to possibly cause
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to revoke the tax exemption status of
these organizations, thus presenting the possibility of a legal challenge to
the constitutionality of restrictions that limit "intervention" in campaigns
on behalf of certain candidates.2 Meanwhile, another political free speech
thereof in response to a written request by such body or
subdivision, as the case may be;
(C) appearances before, or communications to, any legislative
body with respect to a possible decision of such body which
might affect the existence of the organization, its powers and
duties, tax-exempt status, or the deduction of contributions to the
organization;
(D) communications between the organization and its bona fide
members with respect to legislation or proposed legislation of
direct interest to the organization and such members, other than
communications described in paragraph (3); and
(E) any communication with a government official or employee,
other than -
(i) a communication with a member or employee of a legislative
body (where such communication would otherwise constitute the
influencing of legislation), or
(ii) a communication the principal purpose of which is to
influence legislation.
(3) Communications with members
(A) A communication between an organization and any bona fide
member of such organization to directly encourage such member
to communicate as provided in paragraph (1)(B) shall be treated
as a communication described in paragraph (1)(B).
(B) A communication between an organization and any bona fide
member of such organization to directly encourage such member
to urge persons other than members to communicate as provided
in either subparagraph (A) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1)
shall be treated as a communication described in paragraph
(1)(A).
LR.C. §§501(a), 501(c), 501(h), and 4911(d) (2010).
2. The Alliance Defense Fund (ADF) sponsored a Pulpit Freedom Sunday on
September 28, 2008, apparently to allow ministers to intervene on behalf of
particular candidates in the ministers' official capacity at worship services. See Fred
Stokeld & Simon Brown, Churches Prepare to Challenge Ban on Campaign
Intervention, 120 TAX NOTES 39 (2008); Simon Brown, Almost 100 Churches
Participated in Initiative, Pastor Says, 120 TAX NOTES 1260 (2008); Simon Brown,
case, this one involving corporate expenditures under the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), has come before the U.S.
Supreme Court. Much of the code restrictions, the potential challenges
to them, and the constitutional questions of paid political free speech all
coalesced on both sides of the pricey campaign in November 2008
involving California's Proposition 8 to ban gay marriage.4
In fact, some groups have explicitly questioned whether the
Mormon church in particular conducted a substantial part of its activities
in an attempt to influence legislation in the campaign against Proposition
8 in California.' At post election rallies in California, protestors passed
out IRS complaint forms. The paperwork for reporting a tax violation by
a nonprofit was already filled out - with The Church of Jesus Christ of
the Latter-Day Saint's name and address. People simply had to sign the
bottom.6
First, this article will review the I.R.C. rules which prohibit tax-
exempt churches from engaging in substantial activity to influence
legislation and from intervening in political campaigns for or against
particular political candidates. Second, this article will discuss whether
such restrictions were violated, for example, by the involvement of some
churches in the November 2008 election regarding California's
Proposition 8 initiative to ban same-sex marriage. Finally, the article will
review some of the constitutional rules regarding political free speech
IRS Must Act on Pulpit Freedom Sunday, Former Official Says, 121 TAX NOTES 37
(2008).
3. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010) (holding that restrictions on corporate spending in elections is an
unconstitutional suppression of political free speech in violation of the First
Amendment).
4. John R. Dorocak, Recent Constitutional Questions in Taxation: Toward a
Legislative Solution to Constitutional Problems of Same-Sex Couples and Ministers
of the Gospel?, 19 TEMPLE POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 223, 261 n.290 (2009)
(indicating that nearly $74 million was spent on Proposition 8, $36 million in favor
and $38 million opposed).
5. Rebecca Walsh, LDS Elders Showed Seasoned Political Savvy on
California's Prop. 8, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 26, 2009, at News, State, available at
2009 WLNR 5648918. See also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S.
-, -, 130 S. Ct. 876, 979-82 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part & dissenting
in part) (noting the disclosure requirement of donations made supporting or opposing
Proposition 8 resulted in retaliation against some donors).
6. Walsh, supra note 5.
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and spending, together with some of the challenges to the I.R.C.
restrictions, in order to question whether such restrictions are
constitutional.
II. I.R.C. RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF TAX-EXEMPT
CHURCHES: No SUBSTANTIAL PART OF ACTIVITIES IN INFLUENCING
LEGISLATION NOR ANY INTERVENTION IN CAMPAIGNS OF
CANDIDATES
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) specifically provides that an organization can
be tax-exempt as long as "no substantial part of [its] activities" are aimed
at attempting to influence legislation or intervening in "any political
campaign." 7 I.R.C. § 501(h) provides that an election may be made to
determine whether a substantial part of activities involves attempting to
affect legislation. The election may be made to utilize a lobbying
8
expenditure test or a grassroots expenditure test. However, I.R.C. §
501(h)(3)(B) provides that the election may not be made by disqualified
organizations.9 I.R.C. § 501(h)(5) provides that churches described in
I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(1) and certain related organizations are not
permitted to make the election for the lobbying or grassroots expenditure
test to determine whether the tax-exempt status should be revoked.10
Such churches are left with the sometimes vague test of whether a
substantial part of their activities consists of attempting to influence
legislation. Congress included the expenditures test because under the
substantial part test "the standards as to the permissible level of
[legislative] activities under present law are too vague and thereby tend
to encourage subjective and selective enforcement.""
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme
Court similarly criticized vague statutes in the context of a First
Amendment Free Speech Clause challenge to the regulation of corporate
political speech. "Prolix laws chill speech for the same reason that vague
laws chill speech: People 'of common intelligence must necessarily




11. S. REP. No. 94-938, at 80 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4081,
4104.
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guess at [the law's] meaning and differ as to its application."'l2 On the
other hand, I.R.C. § 501(h)(5)(A)-(C) may well deny the use of the rather
bright-line mechanical expenditures tests to churches and their related
entities for calculating whether a substantial part of the activities are
influencing legislation because of the traditional concern for burdening
-13religious organizations with governmental intrusions.
However, the § 501(c)(3) substantial part test has apparently not
been vague in all situations. In Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc.
v. United States, the Tenth Circuit held that a church had engaged in
substantial activity to influence legislation (besides intervening in
campaigns for and against candidates) and revoked the organization's
tax-exempt status.14 In Christian Echoes, the court found that the
church's publications "contained numerous articles attempting to
influence legislation by appeals to the public to react to certain issues.,"
The Tenth Circuit listed twenty-two examples in which Christian Echoes
"appealed to its readers" to influence legislation and then added more
examples of Christian Echoes' political activity. The court also wrote
that "hundreds of exhibits" support a finding that "[t]he activities of
Christian Echoes in influencing or attempting to influence legislation
were not incidental, but were substantial and continuous."'17
12. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S. Ct.
876, 889 (2010) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
13. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (noting the
Establishment Clause in the First Amendment guards against excessive
governmental interference with religion), cited in Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489
U.S. 1, 34 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also John R. Dorocak, The Income Tax
Exclusion of the Housing Allowance for Ministers of the Gospel Per IRC 107: First
Amendment Establishment ofReligion ofFree Exercise Thereof- Where Should the
Warren Court Have Gone?, 54 S.D. L. REV. 233, 250 (2009).
14. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 ( 1 0 th
Cir. 1972).
15. Id. at 855.
16. Id.at 855-56 (noting that Christian Echoes used its media resources to
"attack candidates and incumbents who were considered too liberal").
17. Id. at 856. See also S. REP. No. 94-938, supra note 11, at 84
(acknowledging the Christian Echoes case but stating, "[t]he committee has
proceeded on this provision without evaluating that litigation" and "its actions are
not to be regarded in any way as approval or disapproval of the decision of the Court
of Appeals").
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III. POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF TAX-EXEMPT CHURCHES IN
INFLUENCING LEGISLATION REGARDING CALIFORNIA'S
PROPOSITION 8 BAN ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (NOVEMBER 2008)
Spending during the campaign concerning California's
Proposition 8 ban on same-sex marriages, which was voted on in
November of 2008, was extensive. The spending was variously estimated
to be from $73 million to $80 million. Additionally, a disclosure
statement by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, commonly
referred to as the Mormon or LDS church, reported a total of at least
$134,774 "previously unreported nonmonetary expenditures" in support
of Prop 8. Prior to this report, only $55,000 in donations from LDS
20
were reported. In Christian Echoes, the court indicated that, "a
percentage test to determine whether the activities were substantial
obscures the complexity of balancing the organization's activities in
relation to its objectives and circumstances."2'
Opponents of those churches donating to the "Yes on
Proposition 8" campaign clearly understood that a church could forfeit its
tax-exempt status for substantial activities seeking to influence
legislation, such as Proposition 8.22 Despite attacks on the Mormon
church and others, the Mormons have tried to emphasize that, although
they are opposed to gay marriage, they do "not oppose certain legal
protections for same-sex couples." 23 Although it is clear that the Mormon
church spent over $200,000 in support of Proposition 8,24 the question
18. Dorocak, supra note 4.
19. Tony Semerad, Leaked Memos: Gay Rights Group Makes New Charges
Over LDS Prop 8 Role, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 19, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
5604048.
20. Tony Semerad, Utahns, LDS Church Spent More on Prop. 8 than
Previously Known, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 9, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
2596010.
21. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855
(10th Cir. 1972) (citing Seasongood v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 227 F.2d 907
(6th Cir. 1955)).
22. Walsh, supra note 5.
23. Rosemary Winters, Utahns Cheer, Jeer California Gay-Marriage Ruling,
SALT LAKE TRIB., May 27, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 10225379.
24. See Semerad, supra note 20.
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under the I.R.C. and Christian Echoes would be whether such spending
was a substantial part of the church's activities.
There has been some conjecture about how much the Mormon
church may have supported California's Proposition 8 and encouraged
contributions and support thereof,25 but there does not seem to be any
clear evidence as to the actual extent of the church's participation. In
fact, one newspaper account seems to suggest that even the members of
the Mormon congregation may not have been fully aware of the church
elders' participation in the Proposition 8 campaign and similar
26
campaigns.
In Christian Echoes, the Tenth Circuit rejected a percentage test
to determine whether a substantial part of the church's activities was to
influence or attempt to influence legislation: "A percentage test to
determine whether the activities were substantial obscures the
complexity of balancing the organization's activities in relation to its
,,27
objectives and circumstances. Rather, the court in Christian Echoes
looked to the fact that the activities "were not incidental, but were
substantial and continuous" as evidenced by "hundreds of exhibits." 2 8
The fact that the Mormon church itself only spent apparently $200,000 in
support of Proposition 8, an amount which is presumably a small
percentage of the church's annual income or assets, would not in itself be
determinative under Christian Echoes. In order for critics to support a
challenge to the church's tax-exempt status based on the fact that a
substantial part of its activities were to influence or attempt to influence
legislation, more evidence of substantial and continuous activity by the
church would be needed. Given the structure of the Mormon church, it is
not clear whether such evidence will be forthcoming. One attempt to
develop such evidence included leaked memos concerning the church's
activity in Hawaii in support of an anti-same-sex marriage campaign
25. See, e.g., Semerad, supra note 20 (describing how much money was spent
by the church in support of Proposition 8); Walsh, supra note 5 (describing spending
by the church in the Proposition 8 ballot).
26. Walsh, supra note 5.
27. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855
(1Oth Cir. 1972).
28. Id. at 856.
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there.29 However, that particular effort cited eleven memos.30 Christian
Echoes cites hundreds of documents.3'
In addition, members of various denominations have raised the
question of whether the limitations in §501 on attempts to influence
legislation or intervention in campaigns on behalf of political candidates
violate the First Amendment guarantee of either free speech or freedom
of religion. The next section of this article will discuss some of those
First Amendment claims.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE POLITICAL
ACTIVITY OF TAX-EXEMPT CHURCHES
In the Christian Echoes case, the involved church argued that its
First Amendment free speech and religious freedom rights were violated
by the § 501 restrictions on attempting to influence legislation and
intervening in political campaigns of candidates. In fact, the district court
held in favor of the church that its constitutional rights had been
violated.32 Clergy, and some congregations, have made a direct assault
on § 501's restriction on intervention in political campaigns on behalf of
candidates by preaching in favor of, and in opposition to, certain
candidates, directly from the pulpit, in an apparent attempt to test the
constitutionality of I.R.C. § 501.3 ' The next section of this article will
discuss the recent attempts by some ministers to test the constitutionality
of § 501.
V. I.R.C. §501(C): INTERVENTION IN A CAMPAIGN OF CANDIDATES
FOR PUBLIC OFFICE - ALLIANCE DEFENSE FUND'S PULPIT
FREEDOM SUNDAY.
In Christian Echoes, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
the district court's holding that § 501(c)(3) was unconstitutional because
it put any restraint on the First Amendment right of free exercise of
29. Semerad, supra note 20.
30. Id.
31. Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 856.
32. Id. at 853.
33. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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religion. 3 4 That court analogized to the Supreme Court's indication that
"the First Amendment rights are not absolutes" in upholding provisions
of the Hatch Act "restraining political activities by certain federal
officers and employees."3 The Christian Echoes court then concluded:
In light of the fact that tax exemption is a privilege, a
matter of grace rather than right, we hold that the
limitations contained in Section 501(c)(3) withholding
exemption from nonprofit corporations do not deprive
Christian Echoes of its constitutionally guaranteed right
of free speech. The taxpayer may engage in all such
activities without restraint, subject, however, to
withholding of the exemption or, in the alternative, the
taxpayer may refrain from such activities and obtain the
privilege of exemption. The parallel to the "Hatch Act"
prohibitions relating to political activities on the part of
certain federal and state employees is clear: The taxpayer
may opt to enter an area of federal employment subject to
the restraints and limitations upon his First Amendment
rights. Conversely, he may opt not to receive employment
funds at the public trough in the areas covered by the
restraints and thus exercise his First Amendment rights
unfettered. 36
Thus, one of the early cases under § 501(c)(3) upholding the
constitutionality of the limitations on political activities of churches -
attempting to influence legislation and intervention in campaigns -
expressly relied on similar restrictions on another First Amendment
right: freedom of speech.
In a subsequent case concerning the constitutionality of the tax
law restrictions on political activities under § 501(c), the Supreme Court
used similar reasoning in Regan v. Taxation With Representation when
upholding § 501(c)(3)'s limitations on political activity. The Court in
Regan stated that "[w]e have held in several contexts that a legislature's
decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not
34. Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 856-57.
35. Id. at 857 (citing United Pub. Workers (C.L.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75
(1947) and Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947)).
36. Id.
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infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny." 37 The Court
also stated that "the Constitution 'does not confer an entitlement to such
funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that
freedom.' 3 8 A concurring opinion, written by Justice Blackmun and
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall in Regan, would have held that
the restriction on a § 501(c)(3) organization's ability to lobby was
constitutional only because such an organization could alternatively form
a § 501(c)(4) organization. 39 The concurrence distinguished a line of
cases, including Speiser v. Randall,400nly because of § 501 (c)(4).
If viewed in isolation, the lobbying restriction contained
in § 501(c)(3) violates the principle, reaffirmed today
"that the government may not deny a benefit to a person
because he exercises a constitutional right." Section
501(c)(3) does not merely deny a subsidy for lobbying
activities it deprives an otherwise eligible organization
of its tax-exempt status . . . for all its activities.4 1
The Regan Court and concurring opinion both held that the
decision therein was controlled by Cammarano v. United States42 in
which the court upheld a Department of the Treasury regulation denying
"business expense deductions for lobbying activities" on the ground that
a First Amendment right was not infringed. Rather, Congress had
decided not to "subsidize lobbying." 4 3 Perhaps the Cammarano Court
best explained its reasoning in the following:
Speiser has no relevance to the cases before us.
Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because
they engage in constitutionally protected activities, but
are simply being required to pay for those activities
entirely out of their own pockets, as everyone else
37. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549
(1983) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976)).
38. Id. at 550 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980)).
39. Id. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The Constitutional defect that
would inhere in § 501(c)(3) alone is avoided by § 501(c)(4).").
40. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
41. Regan, 461 U.S. at 552 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19
(1958)) (citations omitted).
42. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
43. Regan, 461 U.S. at 546.
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engaging in similar activities is required to do under the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Nondiscriminatory denial of deduction from gross income
to sums expended to promote or defeat legislation is
plainly not "aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."
Rather, it appears to us to express a determination by
Congress that since purchased publicity can influence the
fate of legislation which will affect, directly or indirectly,
all in the community, everyone in the community should
stand on the same footing as regards its purchase so far as
44
the Treasury of the United States is concerned.
4'
The Regan Court quoted Madden v. Kentucky at length
concerning the difficulty of a constitutional challenge to a tax restriction.
The broad discretion as to classification
possessed by a legislature in the field of taxation has
long been recognized. . . . Traditionally classification has
been a device for fitting tax programs to local needs and
usages in order to achieve an equitable distribution of
the tax burden. It has, because of this, been pointed out
that in taxation, even more than in other fields,
legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification
.... The burden is on the one attacking the legislative
arrangement to negative [sic] every conceivable basis
which might support it.46
Therefore, one might expect that a First Amendment challenge to
the § 501(c) restrictions on the political activities of churches, whether
on freedom of religion or freedom of speech grounds, would certainly
face an uphill battle. Perhaps because of the perceived heavy burden on
any constitutional challenge to the § 501(c) restrictions, one law
professor commented about an orchestrated attempt to raise the
constitutional questions: "I doubt this will ever go to court. And if it did,
the ADF would lose - they don't have a single decent legal argument
44. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (citations omitted).
45. 309 U.S. 83 (1940).




on their side." 47 The Alliance Defense Fund had attempted to coordinate
a Pulpit Freedom Sunday on September 28, 2008, to challenge the §
501(c)(3) campaign intervention ban in a political campaign on behalf of,
or in opposition to, a political candidate. 4 8
On the other hand, those seeking to challenge the § 501(c)
restrictions on constitutional grounds might find some support in Justice
Scalia's comments in the dissent in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce4 9and in the concurrence in Federal Election Commission v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.so where he decries as unconstitutional some
of the limits on "issue advocacy" versus "express advocacy" of
candidates in the Michigan statute and in the BCRA respectively. 5 1 There
may be a parallel between issue advocacy under the BCRA and
influencing legislation under § 501(c), on the one hand, and express
advocacy and intervention in a campaign under § 501(c), on the other
hand. If there is such a parallel, it would seem that, even apart from the
attenuated deference of Regan to tax statutes, there might be some hope
for a constitutional challenge to the § 501(c) restriction on influencing
52legislation. However, the § 501(c) restriction on intervention in a
campaign may be less assailable given the upholding of the contribution
limitations in Buckley v. Valeo. Still, in light of the recent Supreme
Court decision in Citizens United, and Justice Kennedy's citation to
Justice Scalia's dissent in Austin where Scalia cites Speiser, it may be
that even expenditures - but not contributions - on behalf of
candidates and influencing legislation could no longer be constitutionally
47. Brown, IRS Must Act on Pulpit Freedom Sunday, Former Official Says,
supra note 2, at 37 (quoting Robert W. Tuttle, George Washington University Law
Professor and counsel to the Bishop of the Washington D.C. Synod of the
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America).
48. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
49. 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the notion that
preventing disproportionate speech in political debate is central to the First
Amendment), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S.
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
50. 551 U.S. 449, 483 (2007).
51. Austin, 494 U.S. at 679-95; Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 490-504 (2007).
52. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547-48
(1983) (citing Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940)).
53. 424 U.S. 1, 21, 29, 58 (1976) (upholding contribution limitations).
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restricted based on status of the speaker or the conditioning of a benefit
on denial of a constitutional right.54
The Pulpit Freedom Sunday activities may have created a
catalyst for IRS examinations or audits of churches under § 501(c). Tax
Notes, perhaps the Bible of tax," first reported the May 2008
announcement of the Pulpit Freedom Sunday in part as follows: "Erik
Stanley, senior legal counsel for ADF, told Tax Analysts that although
ADF is organizing Pulpit Freedom Sunday, it doesn't plan to direct what
pastors say that day. 'There is no blueprint sermon, and we're not telling
churches what to say and what not to say,' Stanley said."56 As the day for
the Pulpit Freedom Sunday approached, a counter initiative was
organized by Reverend Eric Williams, a "senior pastor at North
Congregational United Church of Christ in Columbus, Ohio.""Tax Notes
reported on the Reverend Williams' sermon as follows:
In his sermon, Williams focused on "the role of
[churches] and that of [their] leaders in public life
today."
Ultimately, Williams said, "the church is the church
when it remains separate from government - free to
organize, to worship and to serve as each congregation,
each synagogue, each temple, each mosque believes."
Tax Notes also reported that "[o]n September 8 Marcus S.
Owens, an attorney with Caplin & Drysdale and a former director of the
IRS Exempt Organizations Division, along with two other former IRS
officials, asked the IRS to investigate whether the ADF is 'coordinating a
mass violation' of the Internal Revenue Code.,, 5 9 By the time of the
54. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. It is also worth noting that
Kennedy, in his Citizens United opinion, omits the reference to Speiser that Scalia
relied on in his dissents.
55. Erik M. Jensen, Critical Theory and the Loneliness of the Tax Prof, 76
N.C. L. REV. 1753, 1755 n.13 (1998).
56. Christopher Quay, Former EO Director: Penalize Promoters of Church
Campaign, 119 TAX NOTES 791 (2008).
57. Brown, Almost 100 Churches Participated in Initiative, Pastor Says, supra
note 2, at 1260.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1260-61.
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designated Pulpit Freedom Sunday, the ADF told Tax Notes that thirty-
two churches participated, and Owens also wrote the Office of
Professional Responsibility requesting that it investigate the attorneys
working with ADF "coordinating mass violation.,,60 Even former director
Owens, as well as professor and counsel Robert Tuttle, seem to agree
that the churches participating in Pulpit Freedom Sunday "will likely
face an audit and a letter asking them not to do it again . . . . [I]t is
unlikely their tax exemption would be revoked." 6 1
In recent years, the IRS has stepped up its efforts to audit
churches concerning prohibited political activities, although usually
enforcement stops short of revocation, as suggested. In a news release
concerning the 2004 electoral cycle, the IRS indicated that of the 132
cases assigned for field examination, twenty-two were closed because
"they did not merit further use of IRS resources." 62 At the time of the
report, eighty-two of the remaining 110 cases were closed.6 3 In flty-five
of the cases, the IRS issued written advisories indicating . . . that
prohibited campaign activity had occurred, but that revocation was not
recommended."64 In one case the IRS assessed the excise tax. In three
cases the IRS did propose revocation, in five cases the IRS found
violations other than political intervention - including delinquent
returns - and "in eighteen cases the IRS found that the organization did
not engage in prohibited political campaign activity." 6 5
The IRS also reported that the Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration (TIGTA) "concluded that there was no evidence of
political bias" in the 2004 election cycle examinations and
60. Brown, IRS Must Act on Pulpit Freedom Sunday, Former Official Says,
supra note 2 at 37; Stephanie Hench and Simon Brown, Pulpit Freedom Sunday
Counterinitiative Gains Support, 120 TAX NOTES 1042 (2008).
61. Brown, IRS Must Act on Pulpit Freedom Sunday, Former Official Says,
supra note 2, at 37.
62. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE
INITIATIVE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 3 (Feb. 22, 2006) [hereinafter POLITICAL




65. Id. at 4.
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recommended, among other things, educational material be distributed.
The IRS indicated that its fact sheet "represents the Service's latest effort
to educate organizations."67 IRS Publication 1828, Tax Guide for
Churches and Religious Organizations, is a similar document.6 The fact
sheet and the publication give numerous examples about activities
carried on by churches. They also describe when an activity may cross
the line from being one that merely influences legislation and is not
substantial to activities such as participating in a campaign involving
candidates, which is prohibited. The examples appear to mirror the
courts' wrestling with the seemingly parallel issue advocacy and express
advocacy regulations of statutes such as the BCRA and the
constitutionality of such regulation.69
In Examples Three and Four of Publication 1828, under the
heading "Individual Activity by Religious Leaders," the IRS suggests
that a column by a minister in a monthly church newsletter stating that
"[i]t is my personal opinion that Candidate U. should be reelected," and a
sermon by a minister during a regular church service in which he states,
"[i]t is important that you all do your duty in the election and vote for
Candidate W" both constitute intervention in a campaign.70
A later part of Publication 1828 distinguishes between "issue
advocacy" and "political campaign intervention," adopting some of the
language of the BCRA. Under this latter heading in Example One,
which appears to be based on Wisconsin Right to Life,72 a newspaper ad,
66. Id. at 5. See also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ELECTION YEAR
ACTIVITIES AND PROHIBITION ON POLITICAL CAMPAIGN INTERVENTION FOR SECTION
501(c)(3) ORGANIZATIONS:FS-2006-17 (February 2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id= 154712,00.html.
67. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES SUMMARY, supra note 62, at 5.See also INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, ELECTION YEAR ACTIVITIES AND PROHIBITION ON POLITICAL
CAMPAIGN INTERVENTION FOR SECTION 501(c)(3) ORGANIZATIONS:FS-2006-17
(February 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom
/article/0,,id=154712,00.html.
68. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Tax GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS, I.R.S. Pub. No. 1828 (2009) [hereinafter TAX GUIDE FOR
CHURCHES], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p I 828.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 8.
71. Id.
72. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
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shortly before a primary election concerning a pending bill which states
"call or write Senator C to tell him to vote for this bill, despite his
opposition in the past," does not constitute intervention in a campaign
where the ad does not mention the election or distinguish C from an
opponent.7 3 In the next example in the publication, the IRS indicates that
intervention is present where an ad "appears shortly before an election, . .
. is not part of an ongoing series,... is not timed to coincide with a non-
election event, . . . and takes a position on an issue that the opponent has
used to distinguish himself from Governor E," who is mentioned in the
ad: "Tell Governor E what you think about our under-funded schools." 74
Similarly, Example Three finds intervention, even without mention of
the candidate, where a head of the board of church elders gives a long
speech at an annual fundraising dinner and states as follows:
For those of you who care about quality of life in
District W and the desire of our community for health
care responsive to their faith, there is a very important
choice coming up next month. . . . You have the power
to respond to the needs of this community. Use that
power when you go to the polls and cast your vote in the
election for your state senator.
The IRS states that intervention is present in Example Three
because the remarks are made at an official church function shortly
before the election, and the elder referred to the election after stating a
position on a prominent election issue "that distinguishes the
candidates."7 6 The publication stresses, in these examples and elsewhere,
that the conclusions are based on a consideration of all relevant facts and
circumstances.
In addition, the publication devotes much less space to a
discussion of "substantial lobbying activity."77 The publication states that
an organization is excluded from § 501(c)(3) status "if a substantial part
of its activities is "attempting to influence legislation (commonly known
as lobbying)." It subsequently defines legislation as "action by




77. Id. at 5-6.
78. Id. at 5.
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Congress, any state legislature, any local council, or similar governing
body. . . or by the public in a referendum, ballot initiative, constitutional
amendment, or similar procedure."79 In discussing the "substantial part
test," the publication states:
The IRS considers a variety of factors, including the
time devoted (by both compensated and volunteer
workers) and the expenditures devoted by the
organization to the activity, when determining whether
the lobbying activity is substantial. Churches must use
the substantial part test since they are not eligible to use
the expenditure test.so
Vi. BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 2002: ELECTIONEERING
COMMUNICATIONS, EXPRESS ADVOCACY, ISSUE SPEECH, AND
DISCLOSURES IN CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION
The Supreme Court and other courts have dealt with
constitutional challenges to other restrictions on political activities of
churches, outside of those restrictions contained in I.R.C. § 501(c),
particularly under the First Amendment. Those courts have typically
dealt with express advocacy, as contrasted with issue advocacy. In I.R.C.
§ 501(c), issue advocacy, under the tax code language of restrictions on
influencing legislation, is restricted only in that it may not be a
substantial part of a church's activities, and express advocacy, under the
tax code language of intervention in the campaigns of candidates, is
prohibited.
1. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
One recent treatment of the constitutionality of restrictions on
political activities is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.x
In that case, a three-judge panel for the District of Columbia Circuit held
79. Id at 6.
80. Id
81. 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 558 U.S.
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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that BCRA (Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act) requirements to disclose
certain donors did not unconstitutionally burden Citizens United, the
producer of both Hillary: The Movie82 and advertisements for the film.
In this case, the parties had agreed that the advertisements for the movie
were not express advocacy; therefore they were not BCRA-restricted
from being broadcast within a certain time period before the election.84
The court also held that the movie itself was express advocacy, however,
so the movie was banned under the BCRA during the prohibited
period. The court reasoned that the movie was the functional equivalent
of express advocacy because it was designed to inform voters about
Senator Hillary Clinton and her fitness for office, so that they could
decide to vote for or against her, rather than focusing on legislative
.86issues.
The district court in Citizens United relied heavily on the then
most recent U.S. Supreme Court decision regarding whether a movie and
its ads were the functional equivalent of express advocacy: Federal
87
Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. That case appears
relatively straightforward, at least initially, and maybe deceptively so, in
holding that a particular ad concerning a filibuster to block federal
judicial nominees, which aired shortly before a primary election, was not
the "functional equivalent of express advocacy;" such ads could not be
constitutionally banned by the BCRA. However, this summary of the
holding in Wisconsin Right to Life may obscure the various strands of
jurisprudence, some perhaps contradictory, concerning permissible
regulation of political activities under the First Amendment. In his
concurrence in Wisconsin Right to Life, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Kennedy and Thomas, would have overruled the case's predecessor,
82. HILLARY: THE MOVIE (Citizens United Prod. 2008).
83. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 281 (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259-62 (1986) and First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 & n.32 (1978)).
84. Id. at 280.
85. Id. at 279-80.
86. Id.
87. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
88. Id. at 474-76.
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McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. Justice Scalia had also
expressed in his dissent to Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce9 0
that he disagreed with the Court's upholding of Michigan's criminally
sanctioned prohibition on spending by a nonprofit corporation in support
or opposition to candidates in an election.9' Subsequently, as described
below, in Citizens United, with Justice Kennedy writing the majority
opinion, the Supreme Court overruled Austin and parts of McConnell.92
Other Justices had distinguished Austin from, or reconciled it with, First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,9 3 reasoning that Bellotti involved
issue advocacy, which could not be constitutionally prohibited.94
Furthermore, in his dissent in Wisconsin Right to Life, Justice Souter,
joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, reviewed the history of
jurisprudence on permissible First Amendment regulations of political
activities but reached the opposite result from the majority.95
In Citizens United,96 the Supreme Court held that the BCRA
restrictions on direct advocacy expenditures by labor unions and
corporations, both for profit and not for profit, were unconstitutional.
The Court explicitly overruled Austin's holding that the government
could constitutionally restrict independent political expenditures by
89. Id. at 483-84, 501-03 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & concurring in the
judgment) (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)).
90. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
91. Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he State cannot exact as the price of
those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment Rights.") (citing Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
92. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S. Ct.
876, 913 (2010).
93. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
94. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 480
(2007) ("Two of the Justices who joined the 6-to-3 majority in Austin relied, in
upholding the constitutionality of the ban on campaign speech, on the fact that
corporations retained freedom to speak on issues as distinct from election
campaigns."); Id. at 489-90 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & concurring in the
judgment) ("However, two Members of Austin's 6-to-3 majority appear to have
thought it significant that Austin involved express advocacy whereas Bellotti
involved issue advocacy.") (citing Austin, 494 U.S. at 675-76 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) & 678 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
95. Id. at 504 (Souter, J., dissenting).
96. 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
corporations, and it overruled the parts of McConnell that upheld similar
restrictions.97
The Citizens United Court rejected the reasoning behind Austin's
corporate independent expenditure restrictions, which relied on "concern
for 'the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
[corporate] wealth' in the marketplace of ideas" to create a government
interest compelling enough to justify the free speech infringement under
strict scrutiny.98 The Court stated that the First Amendment right to free
speech did not depend on the identity of the speaker and that corporate
speakers were afforded such constitutional protection. 99 The Court found
that independent corporate political expenditures did not give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption, so they could not be
constitutionally restricted, despite the reading that some gave to a
footnote in Bellotti.'00 The Court reasoned that Austin "contravened [the]
... earlier precedents in Buckley and Bellotti."'o
In his Citizens United majority opinion, Justice Kennedy quoted
Justice Scalia's dissent in Austin: "'It is rudimentary that the State cannot
exact as the price of these special advantages [of the corporate form] the
forfeiture of First Amendment rights.",102 Justice Kennedy, however,
97. Id. at 130 S. Ct. at 913.
98. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 921 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).
99. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 903, 913.
100. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 884-85 ("While a single Bellotti footnote
purported to leave the question open, this court now concludes that independent
expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or
the appearance of corruption.") (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978))).
101. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 912.
102. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 905 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)). Scalia's concurrence in Wisconsin Right to Life appears to be an
exercise in laying the foundation for the consensus reached in Citizens United in the
opinion written by Justice Kennedy (whom Scalia mentions as having joined the
dissent in Austin and the 5-4 majority in McConnell) to overrule Austin.
Austin was a significant departure from ancient First Amendment
principles. In my view, it was wrongly decided. The flawed rationale upon
which it is based is examined at length elsewhere, including in a
dissenting opinion in Austin that a Member of the 5-to-4 McConnell
majority had joined . . . . But at least Austin was limited to express
advocacy, and nonexpress advocacy was presumed to remain protected
under Buckley and Bellotti, even when engaged in by corporations.
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omitted the citation to Speiser from the quote of Justice Scalia's Austin
dissent. o3 Still, some might argue that Speiser surely, and a broad
reading of Citizens United possibly, supports the position that I.R.C. §
501(c)'s restrictions on influencing legislation and intervening in
campaigns (with expenditures, if not with contributions) are
unconstitutional.
The Citizens United Court did uphold the disclosure and
disclaimer provisions of the BCRA, however. 104 Justice Thomas,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, criticized the Court's upholding
of these provisions:
The success of such intimidation tactics has apparently
spawned a cottage industry that uses forcibly disclosed
donor information to pre-empt [sic] citizens' exercise of
their First Amendment rights ....
Disclaimer and disclosure requirements enable private
citizens and elected officials to implement political
strategies specifically calculated to curtail campaign-
related activity and prevent the lawful, peaceful
exercise of First Amendment rights.05
Justice Thomas specifically cited examples in the popular press
and the amici briefs, many regarding the opponents to Proposition 8 in
California, where "[m]any supporters (or their customers) suffered
property damage, or threats of physical violence or death." 06
Justice Thomas appeared to predict that the disclosure and
disclaimer provisions would similarly have to be held unconstitutional as
prior restraints on First Amendment free speech.10 7 Because of his
dissent, those who dissented to the other portions of the Court's opinion
- Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor - needed to concur in the
portion of the opinion upholding the disclosure and disclaimer
provisions. Apparently seizing on the Supreme Court's upholding of the
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 486-87, 489, 490-
91 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
103. Austin, 494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See supra note 90.
104. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 914.
105. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 981-82 (Thomas, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part).
106. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 980-81.
107. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 981-82.
disclosure provisions in the BCRA, Senator Charles Schumer proposed
legislation, along with Senators Feingold, Wyden, Bayh, and Franken, to
require that CEOs of corporate donors appear in ads for candidates their
corporations support and that contributions exceeding $1,000 be
disclosed to the Federal Election Commission, on the organization's
website, and to shareholders in corporate filings. Later in this article,
the authors suggest, and criticize, requiring a waiver of the corporate veil
of limited liability concerning political contributions.109 These
suggestions possibly run afoul of the First Amendment as impermissible
burdens on free speech, as predicted by Justice Thomas. 10
2. Buckley v. Valeo
The case that began the more modern, post-World War II
jurisprudence on constitutional restrictions on political activity is Buckley
v. Valeo. That case's holding was that a restriction on express
advocacy using such magic words "as 'vote for,' 'elect,'... 'vote against,'
'defeat,' 'reject"' could be constitutionally defended.1' It was within this
context that Justice Scalia, in his Austin dissent,' 1 3and the dissenters in
Wisconsin Right to Life,I14 sought to frame what Chief Justice Roberts
found in Wisconsin Right to Life - that the particular ads were not the
functional equivalent of express advocacy and therefore could not be
constitutionally prohibited. 115Buckley has also been read as allowing
108. Press Release, Senate Democrats Unveil Legislation to Limit Fallout from
Supreme Court Ruling that Allows Unlimited Special-Interest Spending on Elections
- Announce Plan for Senate Passage by July 4 (Apr. 29, 2010), available at
http://schumer.senate.gov/newwebsite/record.cfm?id=324343.
109. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
I10. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
111. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
112. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 486-87
(2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 & n.52 (1976)).
113. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed.Election Comm'n, 558
U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
114. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 513 (Souter, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 476 (majority opinion).
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regulation of contributions but not expenditures." 6 One of the authors
here, from his perspective as a tax professor and past tax practitioner, had
stressed in previous writings on questions of tax constitutionality that tax
practitioners often focus on practical matters rather than lofty
constitutional questions. " Both authors here wonder whether the First
Amendment jurisprudence on political activities helps eliminate the
statutory and constitutional questions, if any, inherent in I.R.C. §
501(c)'s restrictions on influencing legislation and intervening in
political campaigns of candidates.
VII. THE TAX CONSTITUTIONAL CASES ON FREE SPEECH IN THE
BROADER CONTEXT OF POLITICAL FREE SPEECH CONSTITUTIONAL
CASES
As mentioned previously, the IRS has sought to furnish guidance
to exempt organizations concerning what situations might constitute
intervention into a campaign. Perhaps the only solace from the
constitutional jurisprudence that a challenger to I.R.C. § 501(c)'s ban on
intervention in a campaign, like the Pulpit Freedom Sunday preachers," 9
might take would come from Justice Scalia's concurring remarks in
Wisconsin Right To Life and dissent in Austin, now cited approvingly by
the Court in Citizens United. 1200n the other hand, the IRS's explanation
116. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S.
Ct. 876, 901-02 (2010).
117. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
119. See supra Part IV.
120. In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy likely provided support for a minister
of a church who would want to challenge I.R.C. § 501(c)'s prohibition on
intervention in a campaign of candidates:
Either as support for its antidistortion rationale or as a further
argument, the Austin majority undertook to distinguish wealthy
individuals from corporations on the ground that "[sltate law
grants corporations special advantages-such as limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and
distribution of assets." This does not suffice, however, to allow
laws prohibiting speech. "It is rudimentary that the State cannot




of what constitutes influencing legislation in its Publication 1828121 may
seem to be a model of clarity, compared with the Court's free speech
constitutional jurisprudence. In any event, a § 501(c) organization is not
restricted in influencing legislation until such influencing becomes a
substantial part of its activities,122 albeit that substantial part test may be
somewhat nebulous, as evidenced by Christian Echoesl23 and the
legislative history which developed the alternative expenditures test.124
Perhaps Justice Scalia's strongest language is in his dissent in Austin,
where he cites Speiser:
Those individuals who form that type of voluntary
association known as a corporation are, to be sure, given
special advantages - notably, the immunization of their
personal fortunes from liability for the actions of the
association - that the State is under no obligation to
confer. But so are other associations and private
individuals given all sorts of special advantages that the
State need not confer, ranging from tax breaks to
contract awards to public employment to outright cash
subsidies. It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as
558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 905 (citation omitted) (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990) and quoting Id. at 680 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)). See also supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
121. IRS Publication 1828 provides as follows:
A church or religious organization will be regarded as attempting
to influence legislation if it contacts, or urges the public to
contact, members or employees of a legislative body for the
purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation, or if
the organization advocates the adoption or rejection of legislation.
Churches and religious organizations may, however, involve
themselves in issues of public policy without the activity being
considered as lobbying. For example, churches may conduct
educational meetings, prepare and distribute educational
materials, or otherwise consider public policy issues in an
educational manner without jeopardizing their tax-exempt status.
TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES, supra note 68, at 6.
122. See I.R.C. § 501(h) (2010).
123. Christian Echoes Nat'1 Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d. 849
(10th Cir. 1972). See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
124. See Lobbying by Public Charities; Lobbying by Private Foundations, 55
Fed. Reg. 35,579 (Aug. 31, 1990) (codified at Treas. Reg. § 501(h)-1-3).
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the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of
First Amendment rights. The categorical suspension of
the right of any person, or of any association of persons,
to speak out on political matters must be justified by a
compelling state need. "2
126
Speiser was discussed previously in the context of Regan. In
Regan, the Supreme Court held that Cammarano, denying lobbying
expense deductions, provided better support for the constitutionality of
the limitation on lobbying by a tax-exempt organization than Speiser, in
which California's denial of a property tax exemption, on account of a
taxpayer's refusal to sign a declaration that he would not advocate the
violent overthrow of the government, was found to be
unconstitutional.127 Perhaps those seeking to test the I.R.C. § 501(c)
restrictions of political activities of churches, be it ministers preaching on
Pulpit Freedom Sunday or churches spending to influence Proposition 8,
should certainly look to Speiser rather than Regan.
Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for a 7-to-i decision in
Speiser.128 The Court found a violation of due process in that California's
statutory procedure did not show a compelling interest in burdening
speech protected by the First Amendment.29 Justice Brennan wrote:
It is true that due process may not always compel the full
formalities of a criminal prosecution before criminal
advocacy can be suppressed or deterred, but it is clear
that the State which attempts to do so must provide
procedures amply adequate to safeguard against invasion
of speech which the Constitution protects. It is, of
course, familiar practice in the administration of a tax
program for the taxpayer to carry the burden of
introducing evidence to rebut the determination of the
125. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
126. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
127. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545-46. See also supra notes 37-46 and accompanying
text.
128. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 514 (1958).
129. Id. at 528-29.
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collector. But while the fairness of placing the burden of
proof on the taxpayer in most circumstances is
recognized, this Court has not hesitated to declare a
summary tax-collection procedure a violation of due
process when the purported tax was shown to be in
reality a penalty for a crime. The underlying rationale of
these cases is that where a person is to suffer a penalty
for a crime he is entitled to greater procedural safeguards
than when only the amount of his tax liability is in issue.
Similarly it does not follow that because only a tax
liability is here involved, the ordinary tax assessment
procedures are adequate when applied to penalize
speech. 130
Justice Black, with whom Justice Douglas joined, concurring,
wrote perhaps more directly: "California, in effect, has imposed a tax on
belief and expression . . . . I am convinced that this whole business of
penalizing people because of their views and expressions concerning
government is hopelessly repugnant to the principles of freedom upon
which this Nation was founded."" I If those who deal specifically with
constitutional questions in tax focus on the language of Speiser, it seems
difficult to reconcile with Regan, particularly when Justice Brennan
wrote:
[W]e hold that when the constitutional right to speak is
sought to be deterred by a State's general taxing
program due process demands that the speech be
unencumbered until the State comes forward with
sufficient proof to justify its inhibition. The State clearly
has no such compelling interest at stake as to justify a
short-cut procedure which must inevitably result in
suppressing protected speech. 132
In contrasting the case before the court in Speiser with cases
cited by the State of California concerning loyalty oaths by public
employees and officers in labor unions, Justice Brennan explained the
compelling interest present in those cases:
130. Id. at 524-25 (citations omitted).
131. Id. at 529-31 (Black, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 528-29 (majority opinion).
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The principal aim of those statutes was not to penalize
political beliefs but to deny positions to persons
supposed to be dangerous because the position might be
misused to the detriment of the public. The present
legislation, however, can have no such justification. It
purports to deal directly with speech and the expression
of political ideas. 133
On the other hand, in Regan, Justice Rehnquist, writing for a
unanimous court, explained:
Congressional selection of particular entities or persons
for entitlement to this sort of largesse "is obviously a
matter of policy and discretion not open to judicial
review unless in circumstances which here we are not
able to find". . . . We have held in several contexts that a
legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a
fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is
not subject to strict scrutiny. Buckley v. Valeo upheld a
statute that provides federal funds for candidates for
public office who enter primary campaigns, but does not
provide funds for candidates who do not run in party
primaries. We rejected First Amendment and equal
protection challenges to this provision without applying
.134
strict scrutiny.
Justice Rehnquist also used Regan to distinguish Speiser:
We have already explained why we conclude that
Congress has not violated TWR's First Amendment
rights by declining to subsidize its First Amendment
activities. The case would be different if Congress were
133. Id. at 527. Perhaps Justice Brennan's reasoning also casts doubt on the
Tenth Circuit's reliance in Christian Echoes on the analogy to Hatch Act
prohibitions of political activities by federal and state employees. See supra note 36
and accompanying text.
134. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549




to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way
as to "ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas." 135
Apparently the explanation to which Justice Rehnquist was
referring for the holding was this: "We held that Congress is not required
by the First Amendment to subsidize lobbying . . . . Congress has not
infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment
activity. Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR's lobbying."' 36
Thus, the Supreme Court attempted to reconcile Regan with
Speiser by saying that the state in Speiser discriminated invidiously in its
aim to suppress dangerous ideas. 37 Even accepting that characterization
of Speiser, could not the ministers participating in the Pulpit Freedom
Sunday intervening in campaigns of candidates, and the Mormon church
participating in influencing legislation in the campaign concerning
Proposition 8, argue that Congress discriminated invidiously if its
subsidy in the form of tax exemption was removed? Justice Brennan,
author of the Speiser majority opinion in 1958, was still on the court in
1983, and he joined with Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in
Regan. Justice Blackmun would have held that the principle "'that the
government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a
constitutional right' is violated when the government "does not merely
deny a subsidy for lobbying activities, [but] deprives an otherwise
eligible organization of its tax-exempt status . . . whenever one of those
activities is 'substantial lobbying,' [b]ecause lobbying is protected by the
First Amendment." 3 8 The concurrence found that the "constitutional
defect that would inhere in § 501(c)(3) alone is avoided by §
501(c)(4)."l3 The concurrence explains that the § 501(c)(3) organization
could set up a § 501(c)(4) organization to carry on lobbying.140 The §
501(c)(4) organization cannot receive tax-deductible contributions.141
However, in Citizens United, the Court stated that the availability of a §
135. Id. at 548 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 478, 513
(1959) (internal quotation omitted)).
136. Id. at 546 (citing Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513).
137. Id. at 548.
138. Id. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted). See supra notes





501(c)(4) organization, such as a political action committee would not
cure a constitutionally defective regulation of the free speech of a for-
profit or a not-for-profit corporation or of a labor union, where that
142
regulation was based on the identity of the speaker.
What Regan and Speiser seem to point out is that taxation on
speech will not always call for strict scrutiny, although some might
question that conclusion given the strength of Justice Brennan's language
in the Speiser opinion.143 In the cases involving limitations on political
activities apart from the limitations in I.R.C. § 501(c), strict scrutiny has
often been required and a compelling governmental interest has been
found in at least two different ways. In Wisconsin Right to Life, Chief
Justice Roberts explained what might constitute a compelling interest
under strict scrutiny:
This Court has long recognized "the governmental
interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption" in election campaigns. This interest has been
invoked as a reason for upholding contribution limits.
As Buckley explained, "[tlo the extent that large
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo
from current and potential office holders, the integrity of
our system of representative democracy is undermined."
We have suggested that this interest might also justify
limits on electioneering expenditures because it may be
that, in some circumstances, "large independent
expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or apparent
quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions."'"
Chief Justice Roberts further explained another compelling
interest:
A second possible compelling interest recognized by this
Court lies in addressing a "different type of corruption in
the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
142. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. ,, 130 S. Ct.
876, 897-99 (2010).
143. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
144. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 478
(2007) (citations omitted).
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with the help of the corporate form and that have little or
no correlation to the public's support for the
corporation's political ideas." 45
Chief Justice Roberts may have eventually become frustrated
with these analyses when he wrote:
Enough is enough .... Appellants argue that an
expansive definition of "functional equivalent" is needed
to ensure that issue advocacy does not circumvent the
rule against express advocacy, which in turn helps
protect against circumvention of the rule against
contributions. But such a prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis
approach to regulating expression is not consistent with
.146strict scrutiny.
Chief Justice Roberts went on to distinguish Austin from Bellotti,
as discussed previously, stating:
Austin relied, in upholding the constitutionality of the
ban on campaign speech, on the fact that corporations
retained freedom to speak on issues as distinct from
election campaigns . . . . Accepting the notion that a ban
on campaign speech could also embrace issue advocacy
would call into question our holding in Bellotti that the
corporate identity of a speaker does not strip
corporations of all free speech rights. 147
Citizens United overruled Austin and rejected its "antidistortion
rationale" for prohibiting speech based on the corporate identity of the
speaker in a case of independent expenditures for express advocacy or,
perhaps in other words, intervention in a campaign of candidates.148
Now again, possibly reaching the same point of uncertainty as
Chief Justice Roberts in his review of First Amendment jurisprudence,
the question is: do these non-tax First Amendment free speech cases
provide any guidance on the constitutional validity of the restrictions
under I.R.C. § 501(c) on substantial activity influencing legislation
145. Id at 479 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
660 (1990) (overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876).
146. Id. at 478-79 (citation omitted).
147. Id. at 480 (citations omitted).
148. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. at , , 130
S. Ct. 876, 904-08, 912-13.
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and/or intervening in a campaign of candidates? Although the Internal
Revenue Code prohibition on § 501(c)(3) organizations from intervening
in a campaign of candidates might parallel express advocacy in these
other cases on First Amendment restrictions, does the Court's failure to
find constitutional restrictions on issue advocacy in cases such as Bellotti
and Wisconsin Right to Life suggest that I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) restrictions on
influencing legislation might not pass constitutional muster?
Presumably, intervention in campaigns in the form of express
advocacy could have been restricted constitutionally under the
compelling governmental interest to prevent quid pro quo type
corruption, as explained by Chief Justice Roberts in Wisconsin Right to
Life, citing Buckley. 149 However, in light of Citizens United, Buckley
presumably would allow only regulation of direct contributions to
candidates but not independent expenditures for candidates, even if not
expressly I ssue advocacy.150 In addition, how does the restriction of
substantial activity influencing legislation withstand constitutional
review in light of Bellotti and Citizens United unless recourse is had to
Regan and its attempt to distinguish Speiser as involving invidious
discrimination? Still, Citizens United seems to stand for the proposition
that free speech cannot be regulated based on the identity of the
speaker.
As explained elsewhere by one of the authors, tax practitioners
likely have paid limited attention to weighty constitutional issues.152
There may have been little occasion to compare I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)'s
149. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 478 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 26-27, 45 (1976)). See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
150. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 901-03.
151. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 905. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., John R. Dorocak, The Income Tax Exclusion of the Housing
Allowance for Ministers of the Gospel per I.R.C. Section 107: First Amendment
Establishment of Religion or Free Exercise Thereof - Where Should the Warren
Court Have Gone?, 54 S.D. L. REv. 233, 236 n.10 (2009) (describing the external
pressure for tax scholarship to have practical implications); John R. Dorocak, Same-
Sex Couples and the Tax Law: Tax Filing Status for Lesbians and Others, 33 OHIO
N.U. L. REv. 19, 20 (2007) (noting the "relative isolation of the tax professor" from
encountering issues of race, gender, and class and citing Erik M. Jensen, Critical
Theory and the Loneliness of the Tax Prof 76 N.C. L. REv. 1753, 1756 (1998)
(explaining the tax field's "traditional insistence on connection with the real world of
practice")).
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prohibition of substantial activity influencing legislation to cases such as
Bellotti and Citizens United. It may be worthwhile, then, to examine the
extent of the activities in Bellotti and Citizens United to see how they
would compare to the activities in Christian Echoes and activities by the
Mormon church regarding Proposition 8. On the other hand, those
ministers participating in the Pulpit Freedom Sunday now have
arguments regarding their express advocacy, or intervention in a
campaign of candidates, in light of the Citizens United prohibition on
discrimination based on identity of the speaker and Speiser's prohibition
on conditioning a benefit on the nonexercise of a constitutional right. The
ministers' argument for I.R.C. § 501(c)'s unconstitutionality is stronger,
especially in light of Justice Kennedy's use of Justice Scalia's language
from his Austin dissent wherein Scalia cited Speiser. 03 Both Austin and
Citizens United, which overruled Austin, involved third-party
expenditures on behalf of, or in opposition to, candidates. 154
However, in Bellotti, the appellant corporations that wanted to
spend money on issue advocacy concerning the graduated income tax in
the state of Massachusetts apparently did not engage in substantial
activities, but rather sought to have the ban on their spending declared
unconstitutional before undertaking such spending. 5 5 On the other hand,
in Wisconsin Right to Life, the corporation was described by the Court as
an "ideological advocacy corporation" organized under § 501(c)(4) of
the Internal Revenue Code, and it planned to broadcast the ads in
question multiple times - a clear indication that influencing legislation
was a substantial goal for this entity.s Note, however, the entity was not
a § 501(c)(3) corporation but rather a § 501(c)(4) corporation.157 As
previously discussed, the concurring opinion in Regan referred to the
availability of a § 501(c)(4) political action committee as remedying a
153. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 905 ("'It is
rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price of those special advantages the
forfeiture of First Amendment rights."') (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (overruled by Citizens
United, 558 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 876)).
154. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 886-87, 913; Austin, 494 U.S. at 656.
155. First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767-69 (1978).
156. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 458-60
(2007).
157. Id. at 458.
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possible unconstitutional limit on § 501(c)(3)'s political speech
restrictions. However, Citizens United rejected the availability of
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) as a remedy to the unconstitutional prohibition on
speech.'59 Still, cases like Citizens United and Speiser might go a long
way toward assisting a potential defendant, such as the Mormon church
in an action to revoke a tax exemption on the grounds of substantial
activities in influencing legislation. Buckley and its progeny, including
Citizens United, however, would seem to support the I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
ban on intervention in a campaign of candidates, similar to express
advocacy and direct contributions to candidates, but likely not with
independent expenditures.' 60
In reaching for some political compromise on corporate spending
regarding corporate free speech, one might argue that the ability to
operate in a corporate form is not a right but rather a privilege, and thus
can be granted, withheld, withdrawn, and otherwise regulated in
compliance with applicable state law, as is typically the case with any
privilege. Thus, a state could lawfully require, for example, that the
corporate veil would not be available to any liability arising from a
corporation's political campaign expenditures. This would not result in
the forfeiture of First Amendment rights any more than exposure to
potential personal liability of unincorporated organizations or individuals
may affect their First Amendment rights.
This analysis appears entirely consistent with the Tenth Circuit's
conclusion in Christian Echoes, where the court held that tax exemptions
are a privilege, not a right, and thus withholding such an exemption from
Christian Echoes did not deprive it of its First Amendment free speech
right.161 Further, such analysis appears to be consistent with the holding
in Regan wherein the Court cited several precedents indicating that "a
legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right
does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny."16 2
158. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
161. Christian Echoes Nat'1 Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th
Cir. 1972).
162. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549
(1983) (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
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Finally, this analysis seems consistent with the idea expressed in
Cammarano that petitioners were not denied a tax deduction because of
their involvement with constitutionally protected activities, i.e., lobbying,
but were "simply being required to pay for those activities entirely out of
their own pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is
required to do under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code." 63
However, as to this point, which might reasonably be referred to
as leveling the playing field, there is arguably contrary authority in
Citizens United. The Citizens United Court stated that "Buckley rejected
the premise that the Government has an interest 'in equalizing the
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of
elections' . . . . The First Amendment's protections do not depend on the
speaker's 'financial ability to engage in public discussion." Arguably,
under the above referenced corporate veil proposal, and unlike the facts
in Buckley, there would be no denial of any constitutional right, but
simply a condition interposed for the exercise of a state-granted
privilege. However, the distinction between a privilege and a right, at
least in the area of First Amendment speech, does not appear to be
determinative. In Speiser, the Court specifically held:
[T]he appellees are plainly mistaken in their argument
that, because a tax exemption is a "privilege" or
"bounty," its denial may not infringe speech . . . . [T]he
denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech
necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants
to refrain from the proscribed speech.
Simply put, what cannot be lawfully done directly cannot be
lawfully done indirectly. When taken together, the reasoning in Citizens
United and Speiser gives rise to considerable doubt concerning the future
viability of the related holdings in Christian Echoes, Regan, and
Cammarano.
163. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (emphasis added).
164. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, , 130 S. Ct.
876, 904 (2010) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (1976)).
165. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The focus of this article has been the political activity of tax-
exempt churches under I.R.C. § 501(c). That code section prohibits such
churches from intervention in political campaigns of candidates and from
substantial activity in influencing legislation. Constitutional cases
involving this tax provision, such as Christian Echoes and Regan, uphold
its validity despite First Amendment challenges based on freedom of
religion and freedom of speech, in part relying on Cammarano, a case
holding constitutional the denial of lobbying expenses.
However, Speiser raised the issue that a governmental privilege
cannot be conditioned on the non-exercise of a constitutional right, at
least where there was invidious discrimination against a class - in that
case, veterans - who had to restrict their First Amendment right to
political speech by taking a loyalty oath, in order to receive an exemption
from a property tax. A person could also be so discriminated against
because of other status. The question is whether Speiser would provide
any support to those challenging I.R.C. § 501(c)'s restrictions, especially
now in light of Citizens United.
Other First Amendment cases on freedom of political speech do
seem to lend some support to the § 50 1(c) restrictions, although the cases
use language different from that in the I.R.C., and the cases concern
taxpayers other than § 501(c) churches. Buckley, Bellotti, Austin,
Wisconsin Right to Life, and Citizens United all seem to stand for at least
the constitutionality of the regulation of contributions on behalf of
candidates in circumstances of express advocacy. Under those cases, can
I.R.C. § 501(c) prevent any expenditures on behalf of candidates or
expenditures constituting a substantial activity regarding legislation?
That is, do the cases permit only regulation of contributions to campaigns
of candidates? Or do cases such as Regan and Christian Echoes still
constitutionally permit § 501(c)'s restrictions despite Speiser? Citizens
United and Speiser have created considerable doubt in the future viability
of the related holdings in Christian Echoes, Regan, and Cammarano,
which the courts will later have to clarify. 16 6
166. One wonders what impact Citizens United and Speiser might have on
somewhat shadowy organizations such as The Family - "the obsessively secret
Arlington spiritual group that organizes the National Day of Prayer breakfast" and is
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also known as the Fellowship religious organization located at 133 C. St. SE in
Washington, D.C. Manuel Roig-Franzia, The Political Enclave That Dare Not Speak
Its Name, WASH. POST, June 26, 2009, at Al. Another reporter has described the
organization as follows:
The home is owned by the C Street Center Inc., an affiliate of a
religious group known as the Fellowship Foundation. The
foundation sponsors the annual National Prayer Breakfast and
international development projects, and holds Bible study and
prayer meetings at the house, which is registered with the Internal
Revenue Service as a church.
Steve Tetreault, New complaint cites Ensign, LAS VEGAS REV-J., Apr. 2, 2010, at
lA, available at 2010 WLNR 7032787. The organization came to light when eight
senators and representatives were investigated for ethics violations because of the
low rent they paid to live at C Street. Id. A former Department of Justice attorney
said "the alleged housing gift for members of Congress is an example of how the
Fellowship religious organization, also referred to as the Family, seeks to act as a
government power broker." Id. See also Behind the closed doors on C Street: The
Family lives and prays as a fundamentalist group with power at the center of its
agenda, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 19, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 13850104
(providing further details about the controversy in an interview with Jeff Sharlet, the
author of a book about the C Street group).

